Short Takes Blog: The Two Most Important Questions For Investors

Ciovacco Capital Management, LLC (CCM) has a blog called Short Takes which offered an interesting piece lately that I think is important, asking what are “The Two Most Important Questions For Investors?

The piece caught my eye because it echoed my last quarterly commentary and my current view, here are some excerpts from the post.

Many investors toss and turn at night worrying about wealth-destroying bear markets or opportunities they may miss for their uninvested cash, which is nature’s way of pointing out vulnerabilities. When testing your current approach to the markets, it is helpful to look at extreme outcomes. If you can handle the extremes, then you can handle almost anything in between. Therefore, this weekend ask yourself:

Do I have specific plans in place to handle these extreme investment cases?

Case A: stocks rise an additional 91% over the next three years as they did during the final leg of the dot-com bubble (1997-2000).

Case B: stocks drop over 50% as they did in the 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 bear markets.

Of course we might be in a market that ends differently than these two cases (such as a flat market for years to come), but given the current valuation levels relative to history, there is evidence to the contrary. Here is what CCM says:

How could stocks possibly rise 91% between 2014 and 2016 with valuations already stretched? That is a rational question and one that was being asked in 1997. From a contingency planning perspective, it is best to always keep an open mind about upside and downside potential. The S&P 500’s recent breakout from a 13-year consolidation pattern, described here, is another reason to keep an open mind about hard-to-comprehend gains.

CCM CaseASmallForPost

During a bear market, investors start to believe that stocks will never go up again. Conversely, the longer a bull market lasts, the harder it is to comprehend that a bear market will come at some point. When the next bear market begins is highly uncertain, but we know with 100% certainty that another bear market will eventually rear its ugly head. If we know a bear market is in our investment future, it is prudent to have specific plans in place.

CCM II CaseBFEB212014

CCM goes on to show how either the gain or loss would affect your portfolio:

CCM III TableLossForPostSmallB

CCM IV TableLossForPostSmallA

 

CCM goes on to use some technical analysis to determine how best to position yourself, but I think the above to charts are the important ones. Is missing out on a portion of the potential upside a better outcome than experiencing a substantial portion of the downside? This is the question that should be primary in your thought process right now.

Scott Dauenhauer, CFP, MPAS, AIF

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Roberts: It’s Impossible To Replay The 90′s

Written by Lance Roberts | Monday, March 24, 2014

There was a very interesting article out this morning on Bloomberg discussing “Is The Stock Market About To Go Totally 90′s?”  The opening paragraph is as follows:

“Early in 1992, Time magazine projected that the nascent economic recovery would be ‘one of the slowest in history and the next decade one of lowered expectations.’ That was the conventional wisdom and, at the time, seemed eminently reasonable. It also turned out to be completely wrong. The Internet and huge productivity gains propelled above-average economic growth and a rip-roaring, “Cult of Equity” bull market that surged into the year 2000. We spent and borrowed like mad and eased into fluffy college majors.”

There are a couple of issues with this statement worth discussing.

To start with, Time Magazine was not entirely wrong.  The chart below shows the annual percentage change in real economic growth from 1854-present.  I have marked both the zero percent growth rate line and the average rate of real economic growth which is 3.56% historically.

While Time Magazine was early in the sub-par growth rate call for a couple of years, it eventually did come to pass through the entirety of the 21st century, so far. While the internet boom did cause an increase in productivity, it also had a very deleterious effect on the economy. As I discussed recently in “50% Profit Growth:”

“Since 2000, each dollar of gross sales has been increased into more than $1 in operating and reported profits through financial engineering and cost suppression. The next chart shows that the surge in corporate profitability in recent years is a result of a consistent reduction of both employment and wage growth. This has been achieved by increases in productivity, technology and offshoring of labor. However, it is important to note that benefits from such actions are finite.”

This drive to increase profitability did not lead to increased economic growth due to increased productive investment and higher savings rates as personal wealth increased. The reality was, in fact, quite the opposite as it resembled more of a “reverse robin-hood effect” as corporate greed and monetary policy led to a massive wealth transfer from the poor to the rich.

It is easy to understand the confusion the writer has from just looking at the stock market as a determinant of economic prosperity. Unfortunately, what was masked was the deterioration of prosperity as debt supplanted the lack of personal wage growth and a rising cost of living.

The chart below shows the rise in personal debt, which was fostered by 30 years declining borrowing costs, to offset the declines in personal income and savings rates.

As the author correctly states above, it was the “borrowing and spending like mad” that provided a false sense of economic prosperity. The problem with this assumption is clearly shown in the chart below.

In the 1980′s and 90′s consumption, as a percentage of the economy, grew from roughly 61% to 68% currently. The increase in consumption was largely built upon a falling interest rate environment, lower borrowing costs, and relaxation of lending standards.

In 1980, household credit market debt stood at $1.3 Trillion. To move consumption, as a percent of the economy, from 61% to 67% by the year 2000 it required an increase of $5.6 Trillion in debt. Since 2000, consumption as a percent of the economy has risen by 1% over the last 13 years. In order to support that increase in consumption it required an increase in personal debt of $6.1 Trillion.

The importance of that statement should not be dismissed. It has required more debt to increase consumption by 1% of the economy since 2000 than it did to increase it by 6% from 1980-2000.

The problem is quite clear. With interest rates already at historic lows, consumers already heavily leveraged and economic growth running at sub-par rates – there is not likely a capability to increase consumption as a percent of the economy to levels that would replicate the economic growth rates of the past.

It is quite apparent that the ongoing interventions by the Federal Reserve has certainly boosted asset prices higher. This has further widened the wealth gap between the top 10% of individuals that have dollars invested in the financial markets, and everyone else. However, while increased productivity, stock buybacks, and accounting gimmicks can certainly maintain an illusion of corporate profitability in the near term, the real economy remains very subject to actual economic activity. It is here that the inability to releverage balance sheets, to any great degree, to support consumption provides an inherent long term headwind to economic prosperity.

In my opinion it is likely quite impossible, from an economic perspective, to replay the secular bull market of the 80-90′s. While I would certainly welcome such an environment, the more likely scenario is a repeat of the 1970′s. The trick will be remaining solvent for when the next secular bull market does indeed eventually arrive.

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Opposing Views on Profit Margins: Roberts vs Philosophical Econ

There is quite a debate going on in the world of economics in regards to profit margins. On one side of the debate we have those who believe that elevated profit margins are unsustainable and on the other side we have those who believe that not only are they sustainable, they can go higher. It’s important because most of our assumptions that make up our expected returns are in some form or fashion based on profit margins.

A basic law of economics…or logic for that matter is that in a functioning economy excess profits bring competition. If I create a company and it is able to make excess profits, it will attract competition, which will likely compress those excess profits. I’m not the only one who thinks this, those who are considered legend do as well:

Warren Buffett, 1999

[F]rom 1951 on, the percentage settled down pretty much to a 4% to 6.5% range.

In my opinion, you have to be wildly optimistic to believe that corporate profits as a percent of GDP can, for any sustained period, hold much above 6%. One thing keeping the percentage down will be competition, which is alive and well.

– Warren Buffett, Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market (November 1999)

Jeremy Grantham, 2006

Profit margins are probably the most mean-reverting series in finance, and if profit margins do not mean-revert, then something has gone badly wrong with capitalism. If high profits do not attract competition, there is something wrong with the system and it is not functioning properly.

– Jeremy Grantham, Barron’s (c. 2006), via Katsenelson, The Little Book of Sideways Markets.

This brings us to the present day debate which I present from the blog Philosophical Economics (PE) and the blog run by Lance Roberts at STA Wealth Management. The PE blog is the one that irks me the most, but not for the reason you may think. While every fiber of my being wants to disagree with the ideas presented (essentially that profit margins are high and will remain so, potentially going higher and thus justifying high valuations) the post is well written and actually corresponds to what Jeremy Grantham is saying above – “If high profits do not attract competition, there is something wrong with the system and it is not functioning properly.” I’m not convinced PE blog is wrong because I’m not convinced something isn’t wrong with the system.

With that said, I still find it hard to believe that healthy competition in many markets doesn’t exist and that this should at some point in the a cycle act to lower profit margins.

The two blog posts I’m referring to are as follows:

50% Profit Growth And Historical Realities  (STA Wealth Management)

Profit Margins: The Epicenter of the Valuation Debate (Philosophical Economics)

I’ll likely post both to this blog in their entirety later this week.

Scott Dauenhauer, CFP, MPAS, AIF

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GMO James Montier: “Hideous Opportunity Set”

James Montier doesn’t see a lot to like out there, is he right? Here’s what he has to say.

The following interview took place at the www.fuw.ch website and can be accessed here.

James Montier, member of the asset allocation team at Boston-based GMO, has a hard time finding attractively valued assets these days. His advice to investors: Cash – and lots of patience.

James Montier is a full-blooded value investor. Pickings are slim these days, though, says the member of the asset allocation team at the Boston-based asset manager GMO. He sees a «hideous opportunity set» for investors, with the S&P-500 being overvalued by 50 to 70 percent.

James, are you able to find anything in today’s financial markets that still has an attractive valuation?
Nothing at all. When we look at the world today, what we see is a hideous opportunity set. And that’s a reflection of the central bank policies around the world. They drive the returns on all assets down to zero, pushing everybody out on the risk curve. So today, nothing is cheap anymore in absolute terms. There are pockets of relative attractiveness, but nothing is cheap or even at fair value. Everything is expensive. As an investor, you have to stick with the best of a bad bunch.

Where are these pockets of relative value?
There are two and a half of them. The half pocket is high quality stocks, companies that have high and stable profitability. But granted: They are nowhere near as compelling as they were even a year ago, so we are slowly selling our high quality positions. We are by the way also reducing our overall equity weight gradually as this year goes on. We have already taken about five points out, and we are at 50 percent now. By the end of the year we’ll probably be at around 39 percent.

And what are the other pockets of value?
European value is still somewhat okay – although there we have increasing concerns about the prospect of deflation in the Eurozone. The breakup risk of the Eurozone has been diminished, the thing seems to be holding together. But that comes with the cost of outright deflation in peripheral countries. That’s a big issue for European equities, not only because deflation increases the discount rate in real terms, but it also increases their debt in real terms. They will owe more in real terms the longer this deflation goes on.

What sectors fall under European value?
A mixture of asset rich sectors: Utilities, oil & gas, some telecom, some industrials. Names we like in that field are Total (FP 47.565 0.69%), BP, Royal Dutch, Telefonica and the like. The problem with all those sectors is that they tend to be debt heavy, which is why the prospect of deflation is such a big issue.

But the European market in general is not cheap anymore?
No. The time to be buying broad European equities was two years ago.

How do you make sure you don’t fall into a value trap with sectors like utilities and telecom?
You can deal with it by demanding a very large margin of safety. I’d argue you don’t get that right now. You could try fundamental analysis, have guys who think they know something about these stocks, and the third is good diversification. You don’t want too much in any one individual name. That’s why we own 150 stocks in our European value portfolio.

What about the mining sector?
They are tricky. We spent a lot of time thinking about mining as well as oil & gas. We’re quite happy with oil & gas. But the mining sector looks expensive to us today. The problem is there is so much supply coming onstream over the coming years, that commodities like iron ore and copper will show significant excess supply even on the assumption of unchanged demand. So we stay away from materials.

What about financials?
We tend to stay away from them, too. You just don’t know what you’re buying. Their balance sheets are built the wrong way around, their assets are liabilities, their liabilities are assets, you just end up scratching your head. So generally, they end up in our too-difficult-to-understand bucket. We own some financials, but only in small size.

And the third pocket of value?
Emerging markets are relatively attractive. But again, despite their underperformance of late, they are not outright cheap.

Every investor seems to hate emerging markets these days, and everyone loves developed markets like the U.S. and Europe. What do you make of that?
This is weird. We see a reverse decoupling theory. For years we heard that emerging markets can decouple from developed markets, and now we hear it the other way round. Neither of these assumptions is true. I don’t think decoupling can happen in either direction. If my assumption is correct that emerging markets are the canary in the coal mine, developed markets will get a hit.

Brazil, China and Russia all trade on single digit P/E right now.
Yes, true. The trouble is that many of these markets basically consist of two things: Financials and resources. Russia is a prime example. And when you look at the credit cycle in many of these markets, they are often quite extended. So they might look cheap, but you have to ask yourself if the earnings they have today will be sustainable. You definitely want to be cautious with financials in emerging markets. We own some assets in markets like Russia or Korea. Gazprom(Gazprom 0 0%) for example, which trades at a P/E of 2, is very cheap. But again, this is not a market to be enthusiastic. Every asset has been affected by the quest for return. I call this the Cinderella curse: Cinderella has already been taken out by Prince Charming, so you are left with the choice between her two ugly stepsisters.

And in order not to be alone, you end up taking out the ugly stepsister?
Yes. That’s what the investing world looks like right now. Not attractive, but there is no good alternative. You have to own some assets. And you just try to get paid as much as possible for taking these risks.

Do you see outright bubbles anywhere?
By some measures, you can say we are in a bubble, for example in U.S. equities. But it doesn’t feel like a mania yet. Today we experience something like a near-rational bubble, based on overconfidence and myopia by investors. It’s a policy-driven, cynical kind of bubble. Not a mania.

You coined the term foie gras rally, where the Fed just shoves liquidity down investor’s throats. How will it all end?
Probably not well. The exit from these policies is going to be extraordinarily difficult to handle. Today’s situation shows parallels with 1994. Then, the Fed had thought that they had done a great job in communicating their policy going forward. But it turned out the markets were not prepared at all, given the fact that it resulted in the Tequila crisis in Mexico. Couple that with expensive markets, and you have a good reason to want to own a reasonable amount of dry powder. You don’t want to be fully invested in this world.

Since the tapering started in December 2013, markets take it rather calmly.
Yes, the ones that suffered were the emerging markets. The S&P-500 just keeps drifting upwards. But I think emerging markets are the canary in the coalmine, the first signal. They had been the beneficiaries of these incredible capital inflows. So the fact that they are the first ones to suffer makes sense. It’s not a huge surprise that stock markets in the U.S. have not reacted, because the bond market has not reacted. The bond market seems to think the tapering will turn out fine. Maybe they’re right. But there is no margin of safety in asset pricing these days. That’s no comfortable position to begin a tightening cycle.

What if there won’t be any exit?
That’s a possibility. The Fed might decide that growth is still too weak and that inflation is not an issue. Then they could keep their policy in place for longer. The history of financial repression shows that it lasts a very long time. The average length of periods of financial repression in history is 22 years. We’ve only had five years so far. That creates a huge dilemma for asset allocators today: How do you build a portfolio with such a binary situation? Either they exit QE, or they don’t. And the assets you want to own in these two scenarios are pretty much inverse. So you either bet on either one of these scenarios, with is kind of uncomfortable for a value-based investor, or you say because we don’t know, the best we can do is build a robust portfolio. A portfolio that is able to survive in all kinds of scenarios.

And what does such a portfolio look like?
If you have continued financial repression, you want a much higher share of equities, because they are the highest performing asset, compared to bonds and cash. If you think financial repression will go on for another 20 years, you need to have equities. For the scenario that the central banks will exit their policies, you will want to own cash, because that’s the only asset that does not get impaired when interest rates rise. So you have two extreme portfolios: One almost fully in equities, the other almost fully in cash. So that’s what we do: We have about 50% in equities, and 50% in dry powder-like assets. That means some cash, some TIPS, and some long/short equity spread trades. But as said, we are reducing the equity part over the course of the year, to build up dry powder.

The pattern in the past years was rather simple: Whenever the S&P 500 corrected by more than 10%, the Fed launched a new program. Could that continue?
You can’t rule it out. That’s part of the Greenspan-Bernanke-Yellen put. Whenever there was a problem, the Fed rescued equity markets. That created a huge moral hazard. Investors have come to believe that the Fed will always make sure that nothing bad happens to equity markets.

Does that explain the buy the dip mentality we see these days? Or is there really so much money left on the sidelines, just waiting to get into equities?
Valuations suggest that most people are fully invested today. I don’t see much evidence of people being overly cautious, but a lot more evidence of people getting exuberant. But bear in mind: Owning a large chunk of cash today hurts your performance. Following a value-based strategy requires you to be patient. We know that patience is a rare treat in human beings, and it is extraordinarily rate among investors. Patience hurts. But it is less foolish to do the right thing for the long term, than try to second guess what will happen in the short term.

What is the fair value of the S&P 500 right now?
Several valuation measures suggest that the S&P is overvalued by 50 to 70%. Every piece of valuation I do says this market is too expensive. The only U.S. equities we currently own are high quality names like Microsoft (MSFT 40.16 -0.42%), Procter & Gamble or Johnson & Johnson.

What’s your view on Japan?
It is far from obvious that prime minister Shinzo Abe will succeed in breaking the mold. He has succeeded in weakening the Yen, but now they increase consumption taxes next month – and thereby run the risk of a re-run of 1998, when Japan killed its own recovery. For me, there is too much hope and expectation embedded in Abe, not unlike Obama in 2009: There was so much hope projected into Obama that he could only disappoint. I’m not sure that Abe will succeed in ending deflation in Japan.

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Lance Roberts: 30% Up Years: The Case For “Cashing In”

This is the first of many posts from Guest Authors.

Written by Lance Roberts | Monday, November 25, 2013

Last week I posted two articles (see here and here) discussing the potential of a 30% increase in the markets over the next two years, as proposed by Jeremy Grantham, due to the ongoing monetary interventions by the Federal Reserve. Specifically, I stated:

“The primary reason that stocks are likely to climb 30% higher from current levels, over the next 24-months, is because that is what happens during the ‘mania’ phase of a bull market cycle…At the current rate of [the Federal Reserve's] balance sheet expansion, and assuming that correlations remain, the markets could well rise to 2329 by the end of 2015.”

Those two articles, and a subsequent discussion on the daily “Streettalk Live” radio broadcast, sparked the following question from one of my listeners:

“It sounds as if everyone agrees the market will crash probably not this year but likely in 2014 or maybe in 2015. Yet, now it looks like the market may run up another 30%. So what’s the risk in being in the market now if the aforementioned scenario happens? If the market corrects 20% it would still be up 10% from today.”

One of the primary tenants of investing, other than “buy low and sell high,” is always analyzing BOTH sides of every argument to avoid confirmation bias. Therefore, while the articles last week made the case for being invested in the market due to the ongoing liquidity ramp – the question above got me to thinking about the other side of the argument: the case for going to cash.

With the S&P 500 rapidly approaching a 30% gain for 2013 (assuming a year-end target of 1850), the case for going to cash is comprised of three primary issues: 1) the impact of reversions, 2) historical length of economic recoveries, and; 3) historical returns following years of 30% market returns.

The Impact Of Reversions

There have been numerous studies and discussion on the historical impact to returns due to “reversions to the mean.” However, the impact of reversions remains lost on most individuals as the emotion of “greed” overtakes rationality during strong market advances. There are two critically important points in the question above. The first is that he believes there is “no risk” of staying invested even if the market declines by 20%. The second thing you should know is that the math is wrong.

One of the biggest mistakes that individuals make when investing is “not doing the math” which is clearly demonstrated in the question above. Let’s assume that the S&P 500 is trading at 1800. If the market advances 30% it would then be trading at 2340. However, the “risk,” and inherently the reality for the majority of investors, is that individuals would not “sell out” of their portfolios at the next market peak and would suffer the next 20% decline. The flaw in “the math” is that a 20% decline, following a 30% advance, does not leave you holding a 10% gain. In reality, the 30% gain is reduced to just 4% as the market reverts back to 1872.

In other words, if you went to cash today, and a 20% correction occurs at any point in the next two years, your net return would effectively be the same or greater than remaining invested. The impact of reversions are devastating to long term portfolio returns particularly when individuals, as opposed to financial markets, have a finite time span within which to save and invest before needing those savings for retirement.

Economic Recoveries & Subsequent Market Returns

However, the real issue is that the market is unlikely to correct “just 20%.” The next major market correction will very likely coincide with the next economic recession. Of course, by simply writing the “R” word this article will be summarily dismissed by the “financial illuminati” who continue to marvel at the day to day levitations of the markets with the inherent belief “trees can grow to the sky”. Ultimately, all economic recoveries will eventually contract. The chart below shows every post recession economic recovery from 1879 to present.

The statistics are quite interesting:

  • Number of economic recoveries = 29
  • Average number of months per recovery = 39
  • Current economic recovery = 53 months
  • Number of economic recoveries that lasted longer than current = 6
  • Percentage of economic recoveries lasting 53 months or longer = 24.14%

Think about this for a moment. We are currently experiencing the 7th longest economic recovery in history with most analysts and economists giving no consideration for a recession in the near future. This is important because, as stated above, major market corrections occur during economic recessions and those “reversions” tend to be much larger than 20%. The chart shows each of the historical economic recoveries and the subsequent market correction during the inevitable contraction.

 

The statistics are equally interesting:

  • Average number of months of contraction: 14
  • Average market declines during all contractions: -29.13%
  • Average market decline following top seven economic recoveries: -36%

With these statistics, it is somewhat easy to assess the risk/reward of remaining invested in the markets currently in hopes of further advances. If we assume that the markets reach the target of 2340 before the onset of the next economic contraction; the resulting decline, using the historical average of -36%, would push the markets back down to 1498.

Pay attention here. A decline of that magnitude would result in a 16.7% loss from the current value of 1800. Such a decline would almost entirely erase all the gains from 2013. Therefore, even if you enjoy the next 30% increase by staying invested in the market today, you could potentially wind up losing all of that gain PLUS everything from 2013. Ouch!

30% Gains And Sideways Markets

The last piece of the case for going to cash today is shown in the chart below. I calculated the annual returns (capital appreciation only) using monthly data for the S&P 500. I then showed just the first year in which a 30% or greater increase in the S&P 500 occurred and the subsequent years following that 30% gain.

 

Here are the statistics:

  • Number of years the market gained 30% or more: 10
  • Average return of 10 markets: 36%
  • Average return following a 30% year: 6.12%

I have also notated that each 30% return year was also the beginning of a period of both declining rates of annualized returns and typically sideways markets. It is also important to notice that some of the biggest negative annual returns eventually followed 30% up years. If the markets rise to 1850 by the end of 2013, which I believe is entirely possible as managers chase performance, it will mark the 11th time in history the markets have attained that goal.

While it is entirely possible that the markets could “melt up” another 30% from current levels due to the ongoing monetary interventions; history suggests that forward returns not only decline, but bad things have eventually happened.

Go To Cash Now?

I want to be clear that I am not advocating that anyone should go to cash today. The problem with this analysis, unfortunately, is that while individuals are just as unlikely to sell at the top of the market; they will not buy at the bottom. History is replete with market booms and busts and the devastation of individuals along the way.

This is why chasing an all equity benchmark is inherently flawed. Benchmark indexes are riddled with issues that you can not replicate in your portfolio which I discussed in detail in “Why Benchmarking Is A Losing Bet.”

 

“While Wall Street wants you to compare your portfolio to the ‘index’ so that you will continue to keep money in motion, which creates fees for Wall Street, the reality is that you can NEVER beat a ‘benchmark index’ over a long period. This is due to the following reasons:

1) The index contains no cash

2) It has no life expectancy requirements – but you do.

3) It does not have to compensate for distributions to meet living requirements – but you do.

4) It requires you to take on excess risk (potential for loss) in order to obtain equivalent performance – this is fine on the way up, but not on the way down.

5) It has no taxes, costs or other expenses associated with it – but you do.

6) It has the ability to substitute at no penalty – but you don’t.

7) It benefits from share buybacks – but you don’t.”

In order to win the long term investing game, your portfolio should be built around the things that matter most to you.

* Capital preservation (A lost opportunity is more easily replaced than lost capital)

* A rate of return sufficient to keep pace with the rate of inflation.

* Expectations based on realistic objectives. (The market does not compound at 8%, 6% or 4%. Losses destroy the effects of compounding returns)

* Higher rates of return require an exponential increase in the underlying risk profile. This tends not to work out well.

* You can replace lost capital – but you can’t replace lost time. Time is a precious commodity that you cannot afford to waste.

* Portfolios are time-frame specific. If you have 5-years to retirement, but build a portfolio with a 20-year time horizon (taking on more risk), the results will likely be disastrous.

The index is a mythical creature, like the Unicorn, and chasing it takes your focus off of what is most important – your money and your specific goals. Investing is not a competition and, as history shows, there are horrid consequences for treating it as such. It is important to step away from day to day gyrations of the market and focus instead on matching your portfolio to your own personal goals, objectives, and time frames. Building an asset allocation model that can hedge volatility risk, produce income and protect capital are critical to surviving the “long game.” In the end, you may not “beat the index;” but you will substantially increase the odds of achieving your own personal goals which is why you started investing your “hard earned savings” in the first place.

Lance Roberts is the CEO of STA Wealth Managment.

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GMO Asset Class Forecasts 2.28.2014

GMO’s forecast continue to say we should expect low returns over the next seven years.

Screenshot 2014-03-17 16.09.19

Scott Dauenhauer, CFP, MPAS, AIF

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Nobel Prize Winner Robert Shiller on WealthTrack

One of my favorite economists, Nobel Prize winner Robert Shiller (Yale Professor) was on Consuelo Mack’s WealthTrack recently, here is the interview:

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